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THE ORIGIN OF THE CONTEMPORARY
STANDARD FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT
Douglas Y'Barbo*
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright is a federal legal regime of exceptional influence on
both American art and commerce. Literature, film, music,
sculpture, architecture, and software all rely primarily upon federal
copyright law for protection against unauthorized copying, which
if left unrestrained, would unquestionably squelch the incentive to
create or to invest in such creation.
Nevertheless, the legal standard relied upon to determine
copyright infringement is deeply fissured between the two major
copyright courts-the Second and Ninth Circuits.' The remaining
circuits are apparently unaware of this fissure, as evidenced by the
fact that several of them apply both tests interchangeably.
Additionally, the infringement test is by consensus a complicated,
time-consuming, multi-pronged test, containing vague and redun-
dant nomenclature, which for these reasons alone, resists straight-
forward comparison of the two tests. No serious attempt has been
made in the scholarly literature to reconcile or to harmonize these
two disparate standards, nor to favor one over the other, despite
the urgent need to do so.2 This is the focus of this Article.
* Schlumberger Technology Corporation, Dowell Division, Houston, Texas. J.D.,
University of Chicago; M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I am grateful for the
excellent editorial assistance of Amy Werner.
' The two courts most significant (past, present, and future) to the development of
copyright law are the Second and Ninth Circuits. The major dichotomy in the infringement
standard also occurs between these two circuits. Granted, the legal standards for copyright
infringement may differ among the other regional circuits; nevertheless, in copyright law,
the operative legal standards are generally borrowed from the Second and Ninth Circuits.
2 The only critical comparison in the scholarly literature that I have been able to locate
is: Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for Copyright
Infringement, 5 J. ART & ENT. L. 43 (1995). However, this article does not discuss the
positions of circuits other than the Second and Ninth, nor does it discuss what I believe to
be the most significant difference between the two standards-the procedural disparity that
arises from the Second Circuit's "derivation" requirement, which is not part of the Ninth
285
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More particularly, the purpose of this Article is to provide a
thorough explanation of these two legal standards with particular
emphasis upon the points of disparity, its source and its signifi-
cance. To accomplish these objectives, I shall trace the develop-
ment of the two standards from their origin to the present, with
particular emphasis on their historical point of divergence. As we
shall see, although the Second and Ninth Circuits currently apply
different standards for copyright infringement, the two circuits
actually applied the same test many years ago. Indeed, the current
Ninth Circuit standard is a direct descendant from a twenty-year-
old Second Circuit decision. At about that time, a Ninth Circuit
panel inadvertently misread that Second Circuit decision (though
it purported to follow it), which resulted in a comprehensive
recension of the Ninth Circuit standard for copyright infringement.
Though the Ninth Circuit test is a sincere imitation of the venera-
ble Second Circuit test, the two are in fact sharply distinct. They
remain so today.
I shall also classify the infringement tests applied in the
remaining circuits according to whether they apply either the
Second or Ninth Circuit's standards; as well as demonstrate that
although the Second/Ninth Circuit distinction is substantial, it is
essentially ignored by the remaining circuits, who continue to apply
the two tests more or less interchangeably. Finally, a nominally
revised (actually not so much revised as clarified or just relabeled)
infringement standard is offered. This revised standard is shown
in Figure -E-.3
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S STANDARD FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The purpose of this section and the next is to explain in detail
the tests for copyright infringement presently relied upon in the
Second and Ninth Circuits. These sections rely closely upon
Figures -A- (Second Circuit)4 and -C- (Ninth Circuit).' The reader
Circuit's test.
3 See infra p. 322 (Figure -E-).
' See infra p. 318 (Figure -A-).
r'See infra p. 320 (Figure -C-).
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who is already familiar with these standards is encouraged to skip
ahead to the section entitled, "A Comparison."6
The contemporary legal standard for copyright infringement
applied in the Second Circuit is shown in Figure -A-. The acknowl-
edged progenitor of the contemporary standard is Arnstein v.
Porter.' Indeed, the current standard applied in the Second
Circuit is virtually identical to the test recited in that 1946
decision.8 According to the Supreme Court in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. ,' a prima facie case of copyright
infringement is established by proving ownership of a valid
copyright and "[ciopying of constituent elements of the work that
are original."' ° Or, in the Second Circuit's own words: "[clopy-
right infringement is established when the owner of a valid
copyright demonstrates unauthorized copying."" The Feist
standard is depicted in Figure -B-.12 At this level of abstraction,
See infra Part IV.
154 F.2d 464, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (2d Cir. 1946).
s Id. at 468. Though Arnstein is viable authority in the Second Circuit with respect to
the legal standard for copyright infringement which it recites, this case has been overruled
with respect to its holding on the standard for summary judgment in copyright infringement
suits. Specifically, in Arnstein, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling in the
defendant's favor on summary judgment, reciting its infamous "slightest doubt" standard:
"[t]he principal question on this appeal is whether the lower court, under Rule 56, properly
deprived plaintiff of trial of his copyright infringement action. The answer depends upon
whether 'there is the slightest doubt as to the facts.'" Id. In fact, this standard has been
repudiated everywhere, including the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Denker v. Uhry, 820 F. Supp.
722, 729, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1756, 1762 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("TheArnstein court's conclusions
regarding summary judgment, however, have been undermined by recent case law both on
summary judgment in general and summary judgment in copyright actions in particular.
The mere existence of disputed factual issues is no longer sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.") (citing, inter alia, Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9,
11-12 (2d Cir. 1986)). See also, Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating,
that the Arnstein "slightest doubt" standard is no longer good law). The Ninth Circuit has
relied heavily upon the liberalized summary judgment standards in film-adaptation disputes.
Douglas Y'Barbo, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial Appeal: Adapting Novels to Film
and the Copyright Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 299, 379 (1998). Again though, one should
not for a moment mistake Arnstein's demise in this limited aspect for a more general
repudiation of its core holding that set the standard for infringement.
9 499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991).
'
01 Id. at 361.
" Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1324 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285, 1291 (2d Cir. 1997)).
12 See infra p. 319 (Figure -B-).
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the standard is not useable; it requires further refinement before
it can be applied. The inter-circuit disparity that is the focus of
this Article resides in the definition of the latter requirement,
"unauthorized copying" (the bottom-most box in Figure -B-).
In the Second Circuit, the second prong of the Feist standard,
"unlawful copying" (the first is establishing ownership of a valid
copyright) is deliberately separated into two requirements: "a
plaintiff must first show that his work was actually copied ...
[and] then must show that the copying amounts to an improper or
unlawful appropriation."" This is depicted in Figure -A-. Hence,
"unlawful copying" is split into two elements: "copying" and
"improper appropriation." The first of these can be shown either by
direct evidence of copying (the accused infringer is caught red-
handed creating their text with the plaintiffs right beside him) or
by evidence that the accused infringer had access to the plaintiffs
text (a reasonable opportunity to view it) plus some similarities
between the two texts that is probative that the accused infringer
copied (for example, a common misspelled word). If, and only if,
the plaintiff traverses this prong, must he then show that the
copying rises to the level of an "improper appropriation." Mere
copying (or derivation) becomes improper appropriation (hence
copyright infringement) if the amount borrowed was substantial,
and if it was copyrightable.
So the Second Circuit requires that the copyright plaintiff first
prove that the accused text is derived from the plaintiffs, and then
that the material borrowed qualifies for copyright protection, that
is, that the borrowing amounts to an "improper appropriation."
The Second Circuit's two prongs of the "unlawful copying"
requirement and their relationship to one another require careful
explanation. These two prongs are neither distinct requirements
nor two components that together comprise a whole. Rather the
first of these components, "actual copying," is actually subsumed
within the second, "improper appropriation." Again, "actual
copying" means that the accused text is derived from the plaintiffs.
"Improper appropriation" means that the material borrowed from
the plaintiff must be copyrightable. Obviously, if the borrowed
Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 137 (quoting Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131,
13940, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811, 1819 (2d Cir. 1992)).
288 [Vol. 6:285
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material is copyrightable, then it is, by definition, original to the
plaintiff; hence the accused text was by implication derived from
the plaintiffs text. Put another way, the "actual copying" prong
("derivation") could be disposed of entirely, and in theory at least,
one would arrive at the same result. I shall discuss in a moment
the practical consequences of doing this.
Therefore, in the Second Circuit, the plaintiff must show first
that the accused text was derived from the plaintiffs text. Next,
the plaintiff must show that at least some of the material that the
defendant borrowed qualifies for copyright protection-if so, then
copying becomes "unlawful copying" (Second Circuit's term) or
"unauthorized copying" (Supreme Court's term). The first of these
requirements, derivation, can be shown in one of two ways: either
the plaintiff can provide direct evidence that the defendant copied
from the plaintiffs text, this is very rare and almost requires an
outright admission by the defendant or something like an admis-
sion, or the plaintiff can offer evidence of access--defined roughly
as the "opportunity to view"-plus evidence that is probative of
derivation ("probative similarity"). Evidence of access can be
generally placed into one of three categories: (1) chain-of-events 14
(e.g., the plaintiff gave the text to someone who gave it to defen-
dant's personal secretary), (2) widespread dissemination 5 (e.g.,
bestseller status), or (3) purely circumstantial 6 (e.g., defendant
prepared the accused text in less than half the time that it took
plaintiff, defendant has a history of plagiarizing, etc.).
Probative similarity, which along with access proves derivation,
is a simple concept. 7 It is easy to understand and easy to prove.
1 See, e.g., Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 942, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1864, 1866 (8th Cir. 1992); Meta-Film Assoc. Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346,
1358, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 211, 220 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
" See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991);
Cholvin v. B. & F. Music Co., 253 F.2d 102, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 491 (7th Cir. 1958).
"4 See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce, 181 F.2d 664, 667, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339, 341 (7th Cir.
1950); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 900, 903, 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 203, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
17 The late Professor Alan Latman was the first to suggest this change in nomenclature.
Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths
in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990). Prior to Latman's article, the
term "substantial similarity" appeared twice in the Second Circuit's infringement test: once
in the copying prong, and once in the illicit copying prong, see infra page 318 (Figure -A-).
See, e.g., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87,90, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 387,
1999] 289
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The evidence, which consists of portions of the accused text
compared with the plaintiffs, can be either protectable or unpro-
tectable material. Additionally, as one might infer from this
discussion, analytic dissection-performed either by experts or by
counsel-is permitted to show probative similarity. In contrast,
expert testimony is not permitted in the second prong of the
unlawful copying requirement, "improper appropriation." Note also
that to show derivation, the plaintiff need not show that the two
texts are "substantially similar," in any sort of quantitative sense;
indeed, highly probative evidence of derivation may consist of a
single phrase, if there is no other plausible source for that phrase,
other than the plaintiffs text. The point is this: probative
similarity and substantial similarity are different concepts. This
point will be discussed later.
If the plaintiff successfully proves that the accused text is derived
from his or her text, then the plaintiff must then show that the
copying amounts to "improper appropriation" (the box directly
below the "actual copying" one in Figure -A-). Mere copying or
derivation might not rise to the level of improper appropriation for
three reasons. First, the material copied might not qualify for
copyright protection-either because the plaintiff is not the author
of it (it is not original) or because it is ineligible for copyright
protection by statute or common law decision: for example,
idea/expression dichotomy, scenes-a-faire, etc. Second, the copying
may be quantitatively insignificant, that is, it is de minimis. 8
Third, the material copied may be quantitatively significant and it
may be protectable expression, yet it may still not give rise to
infringement because: (1) the "ordinary observer" overlooks the
similarity; or (2) the copying is judged a "fair use" since it is
unlikely to harm the market (or any probably unexploited market)
390 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[Copying] is usually proved by circumstantial evidence of access to the
copyrighted work and substantial similarities as to protectible material in the two works.").
But a few years after Latman's article, the (not trivial) relabeling he suggested was firmly
reticulated in Second Circuit law. See, e.g., Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 137 ("Actual copying
may be established 'either by direct evidence of copying or by indirect evidence, including
access to the copyrighted work, similarities that are probative of copying between the work,
and expert testimony.'") (citing Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811, 1819 (2d Cir. 1992)).
"' Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 138.
290 [Vol. 6:285
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for the plaintiffs text.
These three safe harbors are actually subsumed within the
ordinary observer (or audience impression) standard, which is the
test used to determine improper appropriation. The ordinary
observer test is a deliberately un-analytical, almost superficial
glance at the two texts side-by-side: "whether the 'ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be
disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the
same.' ""1 The only restriction imposed upon the ordinary observ-
er is that she limit her comparison to the copyrightable features of
the plaintiffs text: "This test for illicit copying to prove infringe-
ment of another's copyright demands that the similarities relate to
protectible material.... 20
This concludes my discussion of the legal standard for copyright
infringement currently applied by courts in the Second Circuit.
Again, as evidenced by Figure -A-,2 ' the test has four essential
requirements: ownership of a valid copyright, access, similarity
that is probative of derivation, and substantial similarity as judged
by the casual observer. As we shall see, the Ninth Circuit's test
also possesses these four requirements, though subsumed within a
different structure.
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S STANDARD FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The current standard used in the Ninth Circuit, as recited in
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,22 a recent decision in that
circuit, is shown in Figure -C-. 3 As evidenced by Figure -C- in
comparison with Figure -A-, the two primary prongs, "ownership"
and "unlawful copying," are identical in both the Second and Ninth
19 Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 765, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1418, 1422 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487, 489, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1960)).
20 Folio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 765.
21 See infra p. 318.
22 35 F.3d 1435, 1442, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1994). I shall also rely
upon Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990), since that case recites certain
portions of the infringement standard with slightly greater precision than does Apple
Computer.
' See infra p. 320.
1999]
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Circuit tests. The disparity relates to requirements subsumed
within the second of the two fundamental requirements, the
"unlawful copying" requirement.
According to Apple Computer, unlawful copying requires that the
plaintiff offer "circumstantial evidence of access and substantial
similarity of both the general ideas and expression between the
copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work."24 "Substan-
tial similarity" in turn is proved by a two-part test: an "extrinsic"
or "objective" test and an "intrinsic" or "subjective" test.25 Again,
the copyright plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit must first prove access,
though unlike the plaintiff in the Second Circuit, he does not have
to prove probative similarity. Indeed, the sharp separation between
derivation and improper appropriation-the cornerstone of the
Arnstein test 26 -is conspicuously absent in the Ninth Circuit's
test. Thus, the Ninth Circuit plaintiff proves access, then proceeds
directly to the substantial similarity requirement. Under the
objective test, the first of the two tests comprising the substantial
similarity requirement, the plaintiffs text is divided into both
protectable and unprotectable elements and compared element-by-
element with the accused text.27  According to various Ninth
Circuit decisions, the purpose of this objective test is to determine
the scope of the plaintiffs copyright: "[alnalytic dissection [that is,
the objective test] is relevant not only to the copying element of a
copyright infringement claim, but also to the claim's ownership
element. One aspect of the ownership element is the copyrightabil-
ity of the subject matter and, more particularly, the scope of
whatever copyright lies therein."28 So, once the scope of the
plaintiffs copyright is determined, the only question left is to
determine whether the accused text--or some material part of
it-lies within that scope. Apparently that determination is made
in the objective test as well, since it involves a detailed, analytical
2 4Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1442 (citing Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960
F.2d 1465, 1472, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1434 (9th Cir. 1992)).
25 Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356.
See supra notes 7-8 (discussing Arnstein).
27 Thus, for instance, in the case of literary texts, the objective test examines a more-or-
less predetermined set of components: plot, theme, characters, and dialogue. Brown Bag
Software, 960 F.2d at 1477 (citing Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356-57).
' Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1476.
292 [Vol. 6:285
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"comparison" of the two texts.29
Next, the court proceeds under the Ninth Circuit standard to the
subjective test. Under this test, the ordinary observer-deliberately
eschewing an analytical perspective-assesses the overall similarity
of the two texts. In light of the thorough analysis that comprises
the intrinsic test, the extrinsic test is difficult to justify. For
instance, in the intrinsic test, the features common to both texts
are identified and then assessed for copyrightability. Thus, by the
completion of this test, the fact finder knows whether the accused
text contains protectable expression owned by the plaintiff (and
9 A critical examination of the Ninth Circuit's test raises this question: What is the
purpose of the subjective test? Its ostensible, or stated purpose is to assess the overall
similarity of the two texts, but what is not clear is why that is necessary once the fact finder
has performed the objective test. In the objective test-analogous, though not identical to
the Second Circuit's "probative similarity" prong-the text-in-suit and the accused text are
placed side-by-side. Then the protectability of the elements common to both texts are broken
down, element-by-element, and the protectability of each element is assessed. Again, the
purpose of this test appears to be two-fold: (1) to determine the scope of the plaintiff's
copyright, and (2) to determine whether the accused text contains any protectable expression
from the plaintiff's text. See id. ("Analytic dissection [a.k.a. "the objective test"] is relevant
not only to the copying element of a copyright infringement claim, but also to the claim's
ownership element. One aspect of the ownership element is the copyrightability of the
subject matter and, more particularly, the scope of whatever copyright lies therein.... Data
East teaches that the source of the similarity must be identified and a determination made
as to whether this source is covered by plaintiffs copyright.") (citing Data East USA, Inc. v.
Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1988)). Once the
objective test is applied, it is not clear what is left to do to determine infringement. For
instance, suppose that execution of the objective test reveals that the accused text contains
several copyrightable elements from the plaintiffs text. Aside from fair use-which does not
destroy a prima facie case of infringement, but rather is an affirmative defense to an
infringement charge, and in any event is rarely invoked in the case of fictional works-is
that not the end of the matter? Put another way, the presence of the subjective test-a.k.a.,
the "audience" or "ordinary observer" test-suggests that an accused's text may contain
substantial protectable subject matter from the plaintiffs text, yet still not infringe. This
must be true, otherwise there would be no need for the subjective test. Indeed, one panel
in the Ninth Circuit remarked that the test is "virtually devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic
test has become a mere subjective judgment as to whether two literary works are or are not
similar." Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357 (citing Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1985), as a case 'reaching a result under the intrinsic test
in one paragraph"). Perhaps the subjective test embeds within the infringement standard
the concept that a text, even though it copied protectable expression from another text, still
does not infringe that text if the average consumer would not recognize meaningful similarity
(e.g., derivation). This is a plausible explanation: it fits the data, is not contradicted by any
of it, and is not unnecessarily complicated. Yet for this particular datum, a simpler
explanation exists, whose source is the historical development of the current Ninth Circuit
infringement standard.
9
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since protectable expression is by definition original to the plaintiff,
then that implicitly proves that the accused text is derived from the
plaintiffs). Provided the amount of protectable expression bor-
rowed traverses some de minimis threshold, what more is needed
to establish copyright infringement?
Yet the Ninth Circuit's test-just like the Second Circuit's-per-
mits the accused infringer who borrowed substantial protectable
expression to exculpate himself if the casual observer would not
recognize the accused text as having been derived from the
plaintiffs text. Put another way, merely borrowing some nontriv-
ial, even significant, amount of protectable expression from
another's text does not necessarily make one an infringer. If the
two texts appear different enough to conceal the similarities from
the deliberately unreflective impression of the ordinary observer,
then the accused infringer may borrow with impunity.
IV. A COMPARISON OF THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS'
STANDARDS FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
If the Second and Ninth Circuit standards are in fact identical,
then their disparate vernacular and structure need to be reconciled.
And if they are indeed different, then the implications that flow
from the differences need to be understood-with one standard
selected over the other.
Two legal standards can differ from one another in two essential
ways: content/substance or procedure. As we shall see, the Ninth
Circuit's test has the same essential requirements as the Second
Circuit's standard, though the requirements have been complexly
reshuffled, almost beyond recognition, compared with its Second
Circuit progenitor. Hence, the two legal standards discussed in this
Article have roughly the same content; indeed, their differences
relate primarily to structure, which in turn confers a procedural
distinction, with significant consequences.
As evidenced by the preceding discussion (Figures -A- versus -C-),
the two tests are at least facially different (for example, the Second
Circuit has no "objective" nor "subjective" tests). There are two
primary differences between the circuit tests under which all other
[Vol. 6:285294
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lesser differences are subsumed. First, while the Second Circuit
extracts from the "unlawful copying" prong, a separate derivation
requirement, the Ninth Circuit test includes no such distinction;
instead, derivation and copying copyrightable material are blended
into a single inquiry, "substantial similarity." Second, while the
Ninth Circuit divides the substantial similarity inquiry into two
components, an objective and a subjective test, the Second Circuit's
substantial similarity inquiry has a single component.
Nevertheless, upon closer inspection by displaying and comparing
the two standards graphically, Figures -A- ° and -C-,"' they may
not be so different. Most significantly, they have identical require-
ments, which viewed piecemeal, appear at different points in the
test, and are sometimes performed with different endpoints in
mind. More specifically, the Arnstein test 2 depicted in Figure -A-
" has four specific requirements (the elements appearing at the
ends of the tree): ownership, access, an analytical test (probative
similarity), and a subjective test (substantial similarity based on an
audience impression). Likewise, the Apple Computer test 4
depicted in Figure -C- 5 also has four requirements: ownership,
access, an analytical test (the objective test), and a subjective test.
The ownership and access requirements are not discernibly
different between the two circuits. That leaves the latter two
requirements: probative similarity and substantial similarity
(Second Circuit) and the objective test and the subjective test
(Ninth Circuit). As I shall explain below, these two tests vary
between the circuits not only with respect to their content but more
significantly with respect to their position in the overall infringe-
ment standard.
B. PROBATIVE SIMILARITY VERSUS THE OBJECTIVE TEST
The Second Circuit's analytical test---probative similarity"-is
directed solely at identifying discrete similarities that are probative
3
0 Infra p. 318.
31 Infra p. 320.
32 See supra notes 7-8 (discussing the Arnstein test).
33 Infra p. 318.
3 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Apple Computer test).
5Infra p. 320.
1999] 295
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of derivation. Here, there is no need that such similarities be
"substantial," nor that they relate to protectable material. Proba-
tive similarity is used, along with the access requirement to answer
the question: "Is the accused text derived from the plaintiffs?"3 6
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's analytical test-the "objective
test"-is one half of that Circuit's substantial similarity determina-
tion.37 There, the combined objective of these two tests is to
identify unlawful copying, that is, copying protectable material,
which implicitly subsumes a derivation requirement. Thus,
"derivation" is not at issue-indeed, it is never explicitly deter-
mined in the Ninth Circuit's test but is embedded within the
overall unlawful copying determination. Also, the Ninth Circuit's
objective test differs from the Second Circuit's probative similarity
requirement in that the former is apparently directed in part to
determining copyrightability of each element that appears in both
texts. In contrast, the Second Circuit's probative similarity
determination is focused solely upon identifying whether the
accused text is derived from the plaintiffs; copyrightability is
virtually irrelevant.
C. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY VERSUS THE SUBJECTIVE TEST
The Second and Ninth Circuits are also both comprised of an
audience-impression test. As evidenced by Figure -A-,3" the
Second Circuit's audience test is the sole vanguard that distin-
guishes mere derivation from copyright infringement. Therefore,
this prong must perform two tasks: one, it must separate the
protectable and unprotectable elements, though only nominally;
next, considering only those protectable elements common to both
texts, it must determine whether the two are-according to the
casual observer-"substantially similar." In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit's audience test (or subjective test) has become almost
vestigial, since the objective test, discussed in the previous section,
has been expanded after Sid & Marty Krofft Television Products,
's See Figure -A-, infra p. 318.
Figure -C-, infra p. 320.
's See infra p. 318.
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Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.39 to include an analysis of both protect-
able as well as unprotectable material. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's
audience test does not separate protectable from unprotectable
material (that was done in the objective test) as the Second
Circuit's audience test does. Moreover, just like the analytical test,
perhaps the most significant difference between the audience tests
in the two circuits is their position in their respective standards.
In each circuit, the audience test is performed last; however, by the
time Ninth Circuit courts perform the audience test, they have
already determined which of the common elements qualify for
copyright protection. In contrast, this analysis is left for the
Second Circuit courts to perform during, or within the audience
test.
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO
STANDARDS
So why bother to separate the "unlawful copying" requirement
into two parts, mere derivation and improper appropriation, as the
Second Circuit has done? This question is worth answering
because the Ninth Circuit's standard includes no such separation.
Since the separation adds nothing-again, both tests have the same
four requirements-it can, at most, confer only a procedural
advantage.
Despite any similarity, there are only two ways that the accused
text may not infringe, that is, that it may not have "copied
unlawfully." First, the infringer may not have derived his text from
the plaintiffs-that is, the similarity may be due to coincidence, or
more likely, to the fact that both authors derived their texts from
a common third-party text. Second, even if the accused infringer
did prepare his text from the plaintiffs, that is, he copied from the
text-he is only an infringer if what he took was eligible for
copyright protection. If the accused infringer borrowed only
uncopyrightable elements, for example, elements not original or not
sufficiently concrete to qualify as protectable expression, he is not
an infringer no matter how much material he copied. Thus,
derivation alone does not determine infringement. At the same
39 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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time, if the accused infringer borrowed copyrightable elements from
the plaintiffs text, then by definition, he derived his text from the
plaintiffs; hence, there is no need, in theory at least, to separately
determine derivation. Indeed, dividing the "unlawful copying"
inquiry into derivation and improper appropriation-as the Second
Circuit has done-is really just a procedural short-cut, similar to
the scientist who classifies a microorganism by first performing an
assay to determine whether it is a bacteria or a fungi. Although
her ultimate classification must be far more nuanced, by perform-
ing this single preliminary test, she can quite often eliminate the
need for an extensive battery of tests. Hence, the piecemeal
analysis is not just a heuristic device but a time-saving one as well.
Moreover, truncating the analysis, on average, reduces the error
rate.
And so it is with the Second Circuit's separation of the unlawful
copying requirement into two prongs: derivation (my term) and
unlawful appropriation. The procedural advantage is the simplest
way to justify the division: if the accused text is not derived from
the plaintiffs text, then he is not an infringer, regardless of the
degree of similarity between the two texts, and more importantly,
regardless of whether the material in common qualifies for
copyright protection. Consider how much simpler this derivation
inquiry is than the subsequent inquiry, or an inquiry blending the
two, which the Ninth Circuit requires. In the Second Circuit, to
prove derivation, the plaintiff proffers a list of a few discrete
similarities, either protectable or not, it doesn't matter, between the
two texts, from which, along with proof of access, or the opportunity
to view the plaintiffs text, the fact finder can infer derivation.
These proffered similarities may be slight indeed-for example,
that the accused city map contains a misspelled street name also
found on the plaintiffs map, but not found on the actual street
sign, nor anywhere else. But like this example, it can nevertheless
be highly probative of derivation, which can make this inquiry
unusually facile in the sense that it is unusually objective and
quickly performed.4' Most importantly, the emphasis in the
o See Cooling Sys. and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 492, 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275, 281 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[Clourts have regarded the existence of common
errors in two similar works as the strongest evidence of piracy, but proof of common errors
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derivation inquiry inevitably converges to the source of the
proffered similarity. Thus, if the accused infringer could show that
an old map in the public domain also contains the misspelled street
name, then the probative value of that evidence vanishes. Identify-
ing that pubic domain map may not be easy-which is certainly not
the fact finder's problem-but if it is proffered by the accused
infringer, then the fact finder's job is straightforward. Notice also
that the derivation inquiry will never drift towards protectability,
which is a far more difficult inquiry, and furthermore, whether the
particular element proffered by the plaintiff to prove derivation
qualifies for copyright is irrelevant. Indeed, often the most
probative evidence of derivation is unprotectable subject matter, as
evidenced by the map example. One way to view the Second
Circuit's infringement test is that it is structured so that it avoids,
as much as possible, the virtually intractable determination of
protectability." Thus, in the Second Circuit, before the two texts
are handed to the ordinary observer for a final verdict on infringe-
ment, we know that at least one element in the plaintiffs text is
copyrightable (a presumption triggered by proffering the copyright
registration), and that the accused text was derived from the
plaintiffs text. Granted, these facts, coupled with the ordinary
observer's impression, do not guarantee that the accused infringer
copied protectable expression, they just make it much more likely.
Thus, these three elements taken together are a proxy, though a
coarse one, for the generally tedious and ad hoc task of determining
whether the elements common to the two texts qualify for copyright
protection.
Now contrast the derivation requirement with the "improper
appropriation" prong. (Again, the former is subsumed within the
latter, which is explicit in the Second Circuit's test, and implic-
it/invisible in the Ninth Circuit's test). There, the emphasis is less
on the source of the proffered similarity, and more on whether it
does not obviate the need for proving substantial similarity.") (quoting NIMMER § 13.03[C]
at 13-44).
41 See, Douglas Y'Barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right Conferred by
Copyright, 49 MERCER L. REV. 643, 643-44 (1998) (arguing that a "'copyright' is not an
enforceable property right in relation to a particular work of authorship or the expression
embodied in it, [but rather] that it is a far more qualified property right in relation to a
legally structured market position").
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qualifies for copyright protection. Granted, one way that something
can be uncopyrightable is if it is not original (hence the derivation
and improper appropriation inquiries overlap). But more often
than not, the focus of the protectability inquiry is whether the
particular element qualifies as protectable expression according to
the "idea/expression dichotomy," which is beyond question a very
time-consuming and highly subjective (and therefore error-prone)
inquiry."' And so the Second Circuit's test places this determina-
tion temporarily to one side-to the extent that the court performs
it all-avoiding the test until it is absolutely necessary. By
contrast, the protectability determination is the undisputed center
of gravity of the Ninth Circuit's test.
Therefore, it is clear that the Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit use very different legal standards to determine copyright
infringement. What is interesting is how the approaches of the two
Circuits became so different.
E. THE ORIGIN OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SECOND AND
NINTH CIRCUITS' STANDARDS
1. The Krofft Standard. At one time, the Second Circuit and the
Ninth Circuits applied the same legal standard-both derived from
Arnstein.4 a The two standards diverged in the 1977 decision of
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Products, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp.," an a priori overhaul of the then-current standard.45 The
Krofft test is shown schematically in Figure -D-,4" so that it can
be compared with the Arnstein test, depicted in Figure -B-,47 and
the current Ninth Circuit standard as shown in Figure -C-.4"
42 See, e.g., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91, 190 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The difficult task in an infringement action is to distill the
nonprotected idea from protected expression.").
43 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing the Arnstein test).
" 562 F.2d 1157, 1162, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 102 (9th Cir. 1977).
45 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1997) ("this court's two-part test for substantial
similarity finds its roots in Sid & Marty Kroff.... .
4Infra p. 321.47 Infra p. 319.
4Infra p. 3 2 0.
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As evidenced by Figure -C-, the Krofft court divided the substan-
tial inquiry into two components: an "extrinsic" test and an
"intrinsic" test.49 Prior to Krofft the substantial inquiry test
consisted of a single element, similar to the Second Circuit's test in
Figure -B-. To summarize, the Krofft court split the substantial
similarity test as a result of a deficiency perceived by the court in
the then-current test. More precisely, the Krofft court believed that
the then-current substantial similarity test would condemn an
accused text that copied only ideas from the plaintiffs text, which
are per se unprotectable. Thus, according to the Krofft court, a
refinement was needed, to separately assess whether the accused
text copied protectable expression or mere ideas.
As a result, the purpose of the extrinsic test is to determine
whether substantial similarity exists with respect to ideas. The
Krofft court labeled the test "extrinsic" because:
[Ilt depends not upon the responses of the trier of
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and
analyzed. Such criteria include the type of artwork
involved, the material used, the subject matter, and
the setting for the subject. Since it is an extrinsic
test, analytic dissection and expert testimony are
appropriate. Moreover, this question may often be
decided as a matter of law.5'
In contrast, the purpose of the intrinsic test is to determine
whether the two texts are substantially similar with respect to
expression. Unlike the extrinsic test, which is analytic, the intrinsic
test is administered by the ordinary observer, who assesses
similarity after a casual glance at the two texts.51
This is a peculiar reformulation of the venerable Arnstein
standard, to say the least. It is not clear why one needs an entire
test (the extrinsic test) merely to determine similarity with respect
to (unprotectable) ideas. By definition, ideas can be freely copied.
Therefore, that an accused infringer has copied ideas from the
49 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
soId.
51 Id.
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plaintiffs work is irrelevant for purposes of determining infringe-
ment.52
In fact, the Krofft standard has been harshly and consistently
criticized, so there is little point in reiterating its shortcomings
here.53 Instead, what is of interest is the reason for the Krofft
court's departure from established law and whether the departure
was necessary, or even justifiable. Also of interest is the path from
the Krofft standard to the current Ninth Circuit standard.
So why did the Krofft court depart from the then-current
standard? According to the court's own admission, it did so to
restrict the scope of a plaintiffs copyright from extending to
(unprotectable) ideas. Thus it sought to construct a mechanism to
separate ideas from protectable expression:
[Ilnfringement would be established upon proof of
ownership, access, and substantial similarity.
Application of this rule, however, would produce
some untenable results. For example, a copyright
could be obtained over a cheaply manufactured
plaster statue of a nude. Since ownership of a
copyright is established, subsequent manufacturers
of statutes of nudes would face the grave risk of
being found to be infringers if their statutes were
substantially similar and access were shown. The
burden of proof on the plaintiff would be minimal,
since most statues of nudes would in all probability
be substantially similar to the cheaply manufactured
plaster one."
Having identified the problem, the Krofft court noted the need for
a limiting principle, so that copyright protection is not unduly
52 Of course, copying of any material is probative of derivation, though that is certainly
not what the Krofft court had in mind.
rSee, e.g., MELVILLE AND DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[D] at 13-77
& n.198.6 (1997) (acknowledging that the Krofft decision has much wrong with it while
affirming the decision's structure of analysis).
54 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162-63 (citations omitted).
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extensive.55  The court found this limiting principle in the
"idea/expression" dichotomy:
The test for infringement therefore must be given a
new dimension. There must be ownership of the
copyright and access to the copyrighted work. But
there must also be substantial similarity not only of
the general ideas but of the expression of those ideas
as well. Thus two steps in the analytical process are
implied by the requirement of substantial similari-
ty.56
Thus, the Krofft court departed from the Arnstein test in two
crucial respects: (1) it disregarded the separation of the copying (or
derivation) prong from the more general requirement of unlawful
copying (Arnstein subsumed a mechanism to release the accused
infringer who can prove he did not copy from the plaintiffs text,
even though the two are alike), and (2) it incorporated a two-part
substantial similarity inquiry.
It is necessary to determine whether this new legal standard
devised by the Krofft court was even necessary. The Kro[ft court
began by stating that "[ilnfringement would be established upon
proof of ownership, access, and substantial similarity."57 All that
followed in the court's opinion depended on the veracity of the
above statement. Unfortunately, the statement is materially
incorrect. The statement above proves that the Krofft court
misunderstood the Arnstein standard. Under the Arnstein test, one
does not establish infringement by showing ownership, access, and
substantial similarity; Arnstein said no such thing. Rather, as
evidenced by Figure -A-,58 one proves copyright infringement
under Arnstein by showing ownership of a valid copyright, deriva-
tion from the plaintiffs text by the accused, which is proven by
access plus probative similarity, and by proving "unlawful appropri-
ation," which is shown by "substantial similarity". The source of
58 Id.
5Id. at 1164.
5, Id. at 1162.
5Infra p. 318.
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the Krofft court's concern (and confusion) was the term "substantial
similarity." This term has never included similarity with respect
to unprotectable portions of the work at issue. Courts have consis-
tently instructed the ordinary observer to disregard unprotectable
subject matter.
Although the term "substantial similarity" was never used by the
Arnstein court, the court did use the term "improper appropriation"
in reference to the second prong of the infringement analysis. The
first prong is copying (more precisely referred to as "derivation").
The Arnstein court created a legal standard for copyright infringe-
ment which first required the plaintiff to prove that the accused
text was derived from a text in which the plaintiff held a valid
copyright. If that requirement was met, then the plaintiff was
further required to prove that the copying was "illicit," or "unlaw-
ful." As a result of the court's two-pronged approach, not all
copying was actionable. The Arnstein court repeatedly emphasized
that copying must be "illicit" in order to be actionable:
In applying that standard here, it is important to
avoid confusing two separate elements essential to a
plaintiffs case in such a suit: (a) that defendant
copied from the plaintiff's copyrighted work and (b)
that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so
far as to constitute improper appropriation.59
If copying is established, then only does there arise
the second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful
appropriation). °
Assuming that adequate proof is made of copying,
that is not enough; for there can be 'permissible
copying,' copying which is not illicit.6 '
Therefore, the Arnstein court crafted a legal standard that express-
ly accounted for the fact that an accused infringer may have copied
59 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1946).
60 id.
6' Id. at 472.
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from the plaintiffs text-even to the point that the two appear
"substantially similar"-yet the material taken may not be eligible
for copyright protection. As a result, even "substantially similar"
texts may not satisfy the test for finding infringement.
The Krofft court was concerned about protection for uncopyright-
able ideas. More specifically, the Court was concerned that two
texts could be "substantially similar" and that it would be unjust
to condemn the copying because the material copied consisted of
unprotectable ideas rather than protectable expression. Although
the Arnstein court did not expressly mention this scenario, the
Arnstein standard subsumes this concern by distinguishing copying
from illicit copying, although one can copy without the copying
rising to the level of "illicit" for reasons other than that the
material consists of mere ideas. For instance, the borrowed
material could have been borrowed by the plaintiff from a text
whose copyright has long since lapsed or the material could be
classified as scenes-a-faire.62
Second Circuit decisions closely following Arnstein have even
further clarified the role of the substantial similarity prong. This
provides additional evidence that the Krofft court was fixated on a
concern already accounted for in the Second Circuit's test:
"[Slubstantial similarity" requires that the copying
[be] quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to
support the legal conclusion that infringement
(actionable copying) has occurred. The qualitative
component concerns the copying of expression, rather
than ideas....
"It is only after actual copying is established that one
claiming infringement" then proceeds to demonstrate
that the copying was improper or unlawful by show-
For a more complete discussion of the categories of material that comprise the public
domain, see Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (discussing the
importance of a public domain to the otherwise unworkable copyright system).
' Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1324 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ing that the second work bears "substantial similari-
ty" to protected expression in the earlier work."
[Copying] is usually proved by ... substantial
similarities as to protectible material in the two
works.65
It is doubtless that the Krofft standard was based on a flawed
premise: that the existing standard would condemn texts which
incorporated from the plaintiffs text only unprotectable ideas.
Notably, however, the Arnstein test had already subsumed a
reliable mechanism to ensure that outcome would not occur.
2. The Role of Second Circuit Law in the Krofft Standard. One
must keep in mind that Krofft purports to follow Arnstein: "We
believe that the court in Arnstein was alluding to the idea-expres-
sion dichotomy [by distinguishing copying from illicit copying]
which we make explicit today."66 And later: "We believe Arnstein
is still good law."67 This is surprising since one would never
expect Krofft to be faithful prodigy of Arnstein after a close look at
the Krofft standard. Therefore, it is not difficult to prove that
Krofft is based upon a misreading of Arnstein.' The Krofft court
apparently believed that the existing standard overprotected
original material because it subsumed no mechanism to distinguish
mere unprotectable ideas from protectable expression. 69  The
interesting question is precisely what led to the obvious error by
the Krofft court.
While Arnstein is the undisputed ancestor of the infringement
standard applied in every regional circuit, it nevertheless intro-
" Id. at 137 (citing Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285, 1291
(2d Cir. 1997) and Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1811, 1819 (2d Cir. 1992)).
' Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 387,
390 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288, 293
(2d Cir. 1996).
6 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165, 196
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 103 (9th Cir. 1977).
67 Id.
6 Actually, Kroft cites Second Circuit precedent decided after Arnstein, in particular,
Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90.
6 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164-65.
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duced two slight but insidious flaws into the standard which later
metastasized into chronic confusion over how to apply the standard.
Yet one must be careful to note that while Arnstein introduced
these flaws, it did not itself contain them. Indeed, the flaws relate
solely to nomenclature-the particular labels affixed to the prongs
comprising the test. The Arnstein court knew what it meant. As
we shall see, other courts have been less sure.
Refer again to Figure -B-.70 In its most general form, copyright
infringement is proved by copying and ownership of a valid
copyright. As evidenced by Figure -A-,71 which depicts the Arn-
stein test, this second requirement in turn has two prongs, copying
and improper appropriation. For the latter requirement, Arnstein
used the term "illicit copying." Therefore, Arnstein included the
term "copying" three different times in one legal standard. In each
of these occurrences, "copying" meant different things.72  This
casual usage of the already vague term "copying" has directly
caused chronic, material confusion over the proper infringement
standard, confusion that persists today. Such casual usage has also
led to a different standard used in the Ninth Circuit, a standard
which originally deviated from Arnstein because of a misunder-
standing over Arnstein's multiple uses of the term "copying."
Thus Arnstein said that "[i]f there is evidence of access and
similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine
whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. "7 In that
instance the court was referring to what I have relabeled as the
derivation prong in Figure -E-74 and the upper most appearance
of the term "copying" in Figure -A-.75 Significantly, many courts
after Arnstein confused the term "copying" as Arnstein used it
above, with "unauthorized copying," the leftmost appearance of the
70 Infra p. 319.
71 Infra p. 318.
72 Actually, Arnstein never stated the infringement test in its most abstract form
(ownership plus unlawful copying). Rather, Arnstein focused only on the second prong's two
requirements, copying and illicit copying/improper appropriation, without referring to the
name of the second prong itself. Arnstein used the terms "illicit copying" and "improper
appropriation" interchangeably. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 464.
73 Id. at 468.
74 Figure -E-, infra p. 322.
75 Figure 
-A-, infra p. 318.
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term "copying" in Figure -A-.76 In other words, while Arnstein was
speaking about mere derivation, other courts believed it was
talking about the entire "unauthorized copying" inquiry, of which
derivation is only a part.
Most relevant here, thp Reyher court, in an influential 1976
Second Circuit decision, with the intention of applying the Arnstein
standard, said that "[copying is] proved by circumstantial evidence
of access to the copyrighted work and substantial similarities as to
protectible material in the two works."77 One can compare this
excerpt with the one from Arnstein above and see that they are
roughly the same: copying is shown by access plus similarity.
However, in Arnstein the court was referring to the derivation
prong. The Reyher court misread Arnstein, and believed that it was
referring to the "unlawful copying" prong. In other words, while
the Arnstein court was reciting just a portion of the test (the other
part being "unlawful appropriation," in Figure -A-) the Reyher court
thought that the Arnstein court was reciting the entire test. This
misinterpretation was due solely to the multiple occurrences of the
term "copying" in the standard and led the Reyher court to
effectively sever from the standard Arnstein's "unlawful appropria-
tion," or "illicit copying," prong. Indeed, Krofft is perhaps best
understood as an attempt to reintroduce that element back into the
standard, which the Krofft court understandably believed was
missing.
So the Reyher court restated the Arnstein test with two effects.
First, the Reyher court believed it was reciting the entire test, thus
7 6 Infra p. 318.
" Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 387,
390 (2d Cir. 1976).
78 Figure -A-, infra p. 318. How can we be sure that the Reyher court misread Arnstein?
First, we can simply compare the two legal standards, noting that the Reyher court faithfully
cites Arnstein at critical points in the opinion. Second, Reyher begins by stating the
infringement test in its most fundamental form: infringement requires ownership and
"copying." Id. Next, Reyher states that "copying" is proved by access and "substantial
similarities as to protectable material in the two works." Id. Therefore, beyond question,
Reyher, had in mind the broad meaning of the term "copying," labeled as "unauthorized
copying" in Figure -A-, and not the narrower use of the term copying applied by the Arnstein
Court, labeled as "derivation" in Figure -B-. Again, the Arnstein court said that copying,
meaning "derivation", was proved by access plus similarity probative of copying. Once
plaintiff established this "factual type of copying," he must prove that the copying is legally
actionable, which is done by proving that some of the purloined material qualifies for
copyright.
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completely omitting the "improper appropriation prong" from the
"revised" test that it decreed. Second, precisely because the Reyher
court believed it was reciting the entire test, it slightly reworked
the first portion of the Arnstein test. Thus, paraphrasing the two
passages above, the Arnstein court said that copying, that is,
derivation, is proved by access plus similarity probative of deriva-
tion. Yet the Reyher court said that copying, meaning unlawful
copying, is proved by access plus "substantial similarities as to
protectable material... ."7 Thus the term "substantial similarity"
was introduced into the infringement test.
The Reyher court then required access plus "substantial similari-
ty." But the Arnstein standard for derivation requires only
similarity that is probative of copying; this similarity need not be
"substantial," that is, it need not be pervasive, nor must it relate to
protectable material. Subsequent courts, attempting to reconcile
the Arnstein and Reyher standards, introduced a dual usage of the
term "substantial similarity," so that it referred to both similarities
probative of derivation and to similarities probative of unlawful
appropriation.
Reyher's misreading of Arnstein is significant because it was
Reyher that Krofft followed, hence Reyher's obvious misreading of
Arnstein was instantly infused into Ninth Circuit law.
3. From Krofft to the Present Ninth Circuit Standard. By
comparing the Krofft standard, depicted in Figure -D-, ° with the
current Ninth Circuit standard, depicted in Figure -C-,"' one can
see that it has changed very little. Indeed, its essential structure
has not changed at all. Aside from re-labeling the two prongs of
the "substantial similarity" test by swapping "extrinsic" and "intrin-
sic" for "objective" and "subjective", the only observable change has
been to the extrinsic test. The post-Krofft modifications shall be
discussed below.
From its inception, the extrinsic test, to determine similarity of
unprotectable ideas, had little to justify it. Yet, since the test
permitted analytical dissection, courts gradually began to use it to
separate ideas from protectable expression. In effect, courts used
79 Id.
"o Infra p. 321.
"' Infra p. 320.
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the extrinsic test to determine the scope of the copyright claim,
since once the court reached the intrinsic test, it could no longer
scrutinize individual elements but would be forced to rely upon the
subjective impressions of the casual observer, who would inevitably
ignore the crucial distinction between protectable and unprotectable
expression. Also, once the ideas were separated from protectable
expression, the court could proceed to the intrinsic test, examining
the two texts only in light of the similarities that related to
protectable expression. Thus, the inevitable metamorphosis, the
expansion of the extrinsic test, occurred.
Again, the major difference between the Krofft standard and the
one used today is not a structural one, but a slight change in
nomenclature, from extrinsic/intrinsic to objective/subjective.
Though the terms "objective" and "subjective" had appeared in
Ninth Circuit opinions earlier,82 Shaw v. Lindheim,"8 a 1990
decision, is generally cited as the genesis of the reformulation:
Now that it includes virtually every element that
may be considered concrete in a literary work, the
extrinsic test ... can no longer be seen as a test for
mere similarity of ideas. Because the criteria incor-
porated into the extrinsic test encompass all objective
manifestations of creativity, the two tests are more
sensibly described as objective and subjective analy-
ses of expression, having strayed from Krofft's divi-
sion between expression [intrinsic test] and ideas
[extrinsic test]."
More recently, the Ninth Circuit commented on the scope of the
extrinsic test in Apple Computer, Inc.: "[Tihe extrinsic test now
objectively considers whether there are substantial similarities in
82 At least as early as 1984, seven years after Krofft, Ninth Circuit panels began to
.expand the extrinsic test to include the entire text, and to separate protectable from
unprotectable material. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
965, 967 (9th Cir. 1984). See also, e.g., Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[the extrinsic test is] an objective test which
rests upon specific criteria that can be listed and analyzed.").
8' 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
8' Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357 (emphasis added).
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both ideas and expression, whereas the intrinsic test continues to
measure expression subjectively.""5
Moreover, probably by Brown Bag Software, and at least by
Apple Computer, Inc., the extrinsic test has evolved into a full-
blown analysis of the boundaries of the plaintiffs property right,
that is, which elements borrowed by the accused infringer are
protectable and which are not: "the purpose of analytic dissection
is to define scope of copyright protection." 6 Hence, the extrin-
sic/objective test has expanded at the expense of the now almost
atavistic intrinsic/subjective test.
V. AN INTERIM SUMMARY AND A PROPOSED RELABELED TEST
FOR INFRINGEMENT
To summarize, these are the indisputable facts: (1) the current
tests for copyright infringement applied in the Ninth Circuit (Apple
Computer) and in the Second Circuit (Castle Rock) are not the
same; (2) this difference is material; (3) both tests claim to be
faithful progeny of Arnstein; (4) the current Ninth Circuit test
originated with Krofft, which claims to follow Arnstein; (5) Krofft is
based on a substantial, though inadvertent misreading of Arnstein;
and therefore (6) the current Ninth Circuit test is ultimately based
on a misreading of Arnstein.
The preceding discussion should convince the reader that the
confusion over the copyright infringement standard is more likely
than not due to the multiple usage of the same terms to describe
different legal requirements. Indeed, not only are two key terms
used multiple times in a single legal standard, but the two terms
are themselves vague-"substantial similarity" and "copying."
One source of the confusion has been largely cured, at least in
the Second Circuit. Thus the "substantial similarity" requirement
that once appeared in the derivation portion of the test has been
replaced with "probative similarity" so that it cannot be confused
with the "substantial similarity" requirement in the second prong
' Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing inter alia, Brown Bag Software v.
Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1437 (9th Cir. 1992)).
' Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1443 (citing, inter alia, Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at
1475).
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of the test, which means illicit copying or improper appropria-
tion.87 Still, the term "copying" appears too many times in the
infringement test. The most abstract formulation of the test is:
ownership of a valid copyright and copying. The latter requirement
subsumes two requirements: mere copying and illicit copying.
That is three occurrences of the term "copying." To avoid confusion
and to better clarify the objectives of the test, the term "derivation"
should be used to refer to the requirement that the accused text
was prepared from the plaintiffs text. This requirement, which
does not appear separately in the Ninth Circuit test, is not distinct
from illicit copying; actually, derivation is subsumed within illicit
copying. Thus, a text can be derived from another, yet still not be
an "illicit" copy of the first text if, for example, the borrowed
material was not protectable by copyright. The next prong,
whether the derivation amounts to unlawful copying, should be
referred to as "unlawful appropriation." This is not a new term-it
was used in Arnstein' (though interchangeably with the term
"illicit copying"), and it is used occasionally in Second Circuit
decisions today.8" In addition, the first time the term is used, that
is, to refer to the most abstract form of the test, it should be
replaced with "actionable copying," which captures the two
requirements that it subsumes: derivation and unlawful appropria-
tion. Figure -E- illustrates this suggested nomenclature. °
Besides nomenclature, another reason for the persistent confu-
sion over the infringement standard is that the two prongs
subsumed under the actionable copying requirement are not
actually separate requirements, but rather one is actually a part of
the other, that is, derivation is part of the unlawful appropriation
prong. In other words, if the accused text includes copyrightable
expression from the plaintiffs text, then derivation is implicitly
proved, since if the material was copyrightable, then it is by
definition original to the plaintiff (he is the author) and, therefore,
the only source of it is the plaintiffs text. Thus, one inherently
7 Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some
Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1187, 1190 (1990).T Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288, 293 (2d Cir. 1946).
9 Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811, 1819
(2d Cir. 1992).
90 Infra p. 322.
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proves derivation by proving unlawful appropriation. The signifi-
cance of this is that one could avoid the derivation prong altogether
and instead proceed to the second prong, unlawful appropriation.
Indeed, this is why the Arnstein test (Second Circuit) and the Apple
Computer test (Ninth Circuit) are, in the end, more or less the
same, as we have seen. Arnstein insists upon extracting from the
infringement test the predicate sub-requirement of derivation, no
doubt as a way of avoiding both the arbitrary and labor-intensive
unlawful appropriation analysis to assess substantial similarity
under the ordinary observer in those inevitably frequent instances
in which it is not needed. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit test blends
the two inquiries of derivation and unlawful appropriation.
In theory at least, the Ninth Circuit's test should converge on the
same result as the Second Circuit's test, even without an explicit
predicate derivation requirement. This is because under the
substantial similarity test, an accused text that does not embody
any protectable expression found in the plaintiffs text will be
released. Under the Second Circuit's test, it might very well have
been determined that the accused text was derived from the
plaintiffs, for example, it was proved by unprotectable material
common to the two texts, though it would later be determined
during the unlawful appropriation prong that what was taken did
not qualify for copyright protection, and hence there was no
infringement. The Ninth Circuit would have reached the same
result, though without having bothered to first determine that the
accused text was derived from the plaintiffs.
But what about the opposite scenario? Suppose the accused text
was not derived from the plaintiffs, but they are highly similar.
The Second Circuit test would detect that right away, and stop
right there, avoiding the unlawful appropriation requirement. The
Ninth Circuit would, in theory, reach the same result, but it would
take longer, which always increases the potential for error.
Without a mechanism to detect derivation, or the absence thereof,
then a Ninth Circuit tribunal must plod through the substantial
similarity test, both the objective and subjective prongs. After
doing that, the court would (again, in theory) conclude that the
accused text does not infringe, though not because it was not
derived from the plaintiffs text (it has no way to discern that), but
because it does not embody protectable expression from the
19991 313
29
Y'Barbo: The Origin of the Contemporary Standard for Copyright Infringemen
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1999
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
plaintiffs text. As previously mentioned, it is much easier to argue
over the source of the similarities, than it is to argue over whether
elements in the plaintiffs text (for which there exists a similar
element in the accused text) qualify for copyright protection. The
practical significance of this distinction cannot be overstated.
Perhaps these differences alone are reason enough to favor the
Second Circuit test over the Ninth Circuit test, aside from the fact
that the Ninth Circuit test is derived from a 50-year-old inadver-
tent misreading of a Second Circuit decision. Thus, the Second
Circuit has a far more summary judgment-friendly standard since
it allows accused infringers, particularly in those instances
involving two highly similar texts in which the plaintiffs is
characterized by low originality, to walk away from the dispute
once they can show that they did not derive their text from the
plaintiffs. Yet in the Ninth Circuit, which again should yield the
same result, the accused infringer must suffer through the
substantial similarity analysis, or at least the objective portion of
it anyway, since the plaintiffs prima facie case does not include
proof of derivation apart from the requirement to prove similarity
with respect to protectable elements. Therefore, splitting the
actionable copying prong into two separate requirements is not only
sensible but procedurally (and heuristically) useful. It allows the
fact finder to stop and assess derivation separate from the far more
tedious and complicated task of determining whether what was
borrowed qualifies for protection by copyright. It is also procedural-
ly superior since it allows the court to truncate the dispute if the
plaintiff is unable to prove derivation, and thus avoids becoming
mired in the next part of the test.
VI. THE REMAINING REGIONAL CIRCUITS
In the first portion of this Article, I sought to show that a
genuine difference exists between two standards for copyright
infringement. Having shown that it is significant, I shall now
argue that the distinction is underappreciated-indeed, virtually
ignored-among the Courts of Appeals.
According to my research, the Courts of Appeals are roughly split
between the two polar standards decreed by the Second and Ninth
Circuits. Of the nine remaining regional circuits, four follow the
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Second Circuit and five have adopted the Ninth Circuit approach.
This division roughly follows geography: The First,91 Fifth, 92
Tenth,93 and Eleventh' Circuits follow the Second Circuit ap-
proach, while the Third,95 Fourth,96 Sixth,97 Seventh, 9 and
91 CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1513, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1072 (1st Cir. 1996) ("To show actionable copying and therefore
satisfy Feist's second prong, 'a plaintiff must first prove that the alleged infringer copied
plaintiff's copyrighted work as a factual matter; to do this he or she may either present direct
evidence of factual copying or, if that is unavailable, evidence that the alleged infringer had
access to the copyrighted work and that the offending and copyrighted works are so similar
that the court may infer that there was factual copying (i.e., probative similarity.)' Next, a
plaintiff must 'prove that the copying of copyrighted material was so extensive that it
rendered the offending and copyrighted works substantially similar.'") (citations omitted).
' Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340-41, 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1644 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Two separate components underlie proof of
actionable copying. First is the factual question whether the alleged infringer actually used
the copyrighted material to create his own work. Copying as a factual matter typically may
be inferred from proof of access to the copyrighted work and 'probative similarity.' Not all
copying, however, is copyright infringement. The second and usually more difficult question
is whether the copying is legally actionable. This requires a court to determine whether
there is substantial similarity between the two works.") (citations omitted) (citing, inter alia,
Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1635 (5th Cir. 1987)).
" Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1284, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Plaintiff can indirectly prove copying by establishing that
Defendants had access to the copyrighted work and that there are probative similarities.
[Copying, however, does] not end the court's inquiry, as liability for copyright infringement
will attach only where protected elements ... are copied. To impose such liability, the court
must find substantial similarity between those aspects of Plaintiff's dolls which are legally
protectable and the Defendant's dolls.") (citations omitted).
" MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Engineering Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1554, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1613 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[Plroof of copying may be shown either by direct evidence, or,
in the absence of direct evidence, it may be inferred from indirect evidence demonstrating
that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there are probative
similarities between the alleged infringing work and the copyrighted work.") (citations
omitted).
9 Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1417, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[copying is] proven by 'showing that the defendant had access to
the allegedly infringed work,.., that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar
to the copyrighted work.") (citing Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (3d Cir. 1986)).
"Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 582, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785, 1786 (4th Cir. 1996)
("Towler [the plaintiff] can raise a presumption of copying by showing both that Sayles had
access to 'Crossed Wires' [the work involved in the suit] and that the two screenplays in
question are substantially similar.") (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731,
732, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132, 1133 (4th Cir. 1990)). Additionally: "there are two prongs
to the substantial similarity inquiry ... an 'extrinsic' or 'objective' inquiry ... [and an]
'intrinsic' or 'subjective' test." Dawson, 905 F.2d at 732-33.
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Eighth9 Circuits follow the Ninth Circuit approach. More impor-
tantly though, this list is a little less than precise, since a few of
the circuits have occasionally blended the two approaches in a
single opinion, or switched back and forth between the two from
one opinion to the next. This suggests that the circuits generally
regard any disparity between the Second and Ninth Circuits'
infringement standards as a mere difference in nomenclature,
rather than as a genuine difference that may lead to a difference
in outcome. Again, one objective of this Article is to urge the
significance of the difference between the two circuits' tests for
infringement.
For instance, the term "probative similarity" appears infrequently
in Ninth Circuit opinions and in opinions from courts that ostensi-
bly follow the Ninth Circuit approach. Again, the term "probative
similarity" is properly used to distinguish evidence that tends to
prove derivation versus evidence that tends to prove legally
actionable copying (infringement); the latter is referred to in Second
Circuit vernacular as "substantial similarity." Beyond ques-
tion-and as discussed in this Article-the Ninth Circuit eschews
this distinction. Yet, a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Fodor v. Time
" Marigold Foods, Inc. v. Purity Dairies, Inc., Nos. 91-5593, 91-5668, 1992 WL 127017,
at *2 (6th Cir. June 10, 1992) ("When direct evidence of copying is unavailable, evidence of
the alleged infringer's access to the underlying work and a substantial similarity between
the alleged copy and the original are 'in themselves sufficient to create an inference of
copying and to establish a prima facie case of copying.' ") (citation omitted). See also, Baxter
v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Absent
evidence of access, a 'striking similarity' between the works may give rise to a permissible
inference of copying.") (citations omitted).
's Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 508-09, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1140, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Clopyright infringement may be inferred when it is
shown that 'the defendant had access to the copyrighted work, and the accused work is
substantially similar to the copyrighted work'... '[Slubstantial similarity is made by the
'ordinary observer test.' ") (citations omitted).
" Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1864, 1865-
66 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("To establish her claim for copyright infringement in the absence of
direct evidence of copying, Hartman had to prove: (1) her ownership of the copyright ... ;
(2) access. ; and (3) substantial similarity .. .") (quoting McCulloch v. Albert E. Prince,
Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Hartman court went on to say: "[dietermina-
tion of substantial similarity involves a two-step analysis. There must be substantial
similarity 'not only of general ideas but of the expressions of those ideas as well. [F]irst,
similarity of ideas is analyzed extrinsically, focusing on objective similarities... similarity
of expression is evaluated using an intrinsic test.. . ." Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120 (citation
omitted) (citing McCulloch, 823 F.2d at 316).
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Warner, used the term "probative similarity," though interchange-
ably with the term "substantial similarity.""' A recent district
court decision in the Eighth Circuit (again, a circuit that purports
to follow the Ninth Circuit's approach) also refers to "probative
similarity," though like Fodor, uses it interchangeably with
"substantial similarity."' And therefore, these courts do not
extract from the infringement analysis a distinct derivation
requirement, as a faithful reading of Arnstein requires.
Consider also this remark from a frequently cited Fourth Circuit
decision:
Some courts use a different set of labels for the two-
prong inquiry, referring to the first prong as estab-
lishment of copying and the second prong as estab-
lishment of illicit appropriation (citation omitted).
The difference in labels need not concern us because
the apparent consensus as to the nature of the tests
applicable to each prong of the substantial similarity
inquiry smooths over, as a practical matter, underly-
ing differences in the inquiry's two characteriza-
tions.'0 2
Therefore, as I have shown, though the Second and Ninth Circuit
tests are genuinely different legal standards, this difference, or at
least its significance, has escaped the attention of the remaining
regional Courts of Appeals.
10 Fodor v. Time Warner, Nos. 92-56169, 92-56454, 1994 WL 65287, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar.
2, 1994). This is the only Ninth Circuit decision that refers to "probative similarity." In
Fodor, the court cites Nimmer's treatise for the proposition that proof of copying, which along
with proof of ownership equals infringement, requires access plus probative similarity. Yet
the court states in the very next sentence that: "Even if two works are substantially similar,
however, there is no infringement liability if the challenged work was independently
created." Id.
101 Control Data Sys., Inc. v. Infoware, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Minn. 1995).
Consider this passage from the opinion: "The Court next considers whether there are
'probative similarities" between [the two works]. Control Data asserts that the AlphaCyber
source code is substantially similar to the NOS source code." Id. at 1321. Just a few
sentences later the court goes on to say: '[Tihe Court finds that the similarities in these
areas are indeed substantial and constitute probative evidence of copying." Id. These
passages indicate that the court has confused the two terms-beyond question, it believes
the two terms are synonymous.
102 Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733, n.1, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132,
1134, n.1 (4th Cir. 1990).
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